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**Neoliberalism, Nationalism and Border
Arrangements in the Southern Balkans**

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Neoliberalism and Borders in the Balkans

In this presentation I critically examine the contradiction between the profound nationalism and antagonism produced on the level of official political rhetoric between the republic of Macedonia and Greece surrounding the name “Macedonia,” and the intensive exchange in the domain of capital, labour and symbols/ideas, as well as the intensive movements in the border areas between the two countries. To explain the paradox of the nationalist claims and intensive economic exchange, I suggest that instead to seek explanation by going back to history and look for answers in the past (especially antiquity), one needs to highlight the changes of contemporary nation-states, and how neoliberalism and globalization have been affecting local political-economic dynamics in Macedonia and Greece.

The relationship between the local and the global, between contemporary nation-states and globalization, is complicated indeed, given that globalization turns into a “force” which according to Giddens “means everything and it means nothing” (Giddens 2000). I find Saskia Sassen’s work most helpful in explaining this complex articulation (Sassen 2006). Sassen offers concrete framework by situating its beginning of the 1980s in the “unfamous Thatcher-Reagan years.” In her monumental work *Territory, Authority, Rights* (2006), she argues for an economic roots of globalization which initially served to “neutralize” and “naturalize” the market, but also triggered destabilization of the public sphere and initiated the emergence of new, mostly private, actors ranging from “business federations to offshore financiers and diaspora lobbies.” Declining state control over its economic sphere is marked by increase of stock markets’ significance, wide opportunities of capital flows, which, in turn generates radical transformation of the public-private relationships.

The best value of Sassen’s work is her ability to overcome the structuralist impasse of binaries by showing that the power of authority is moving both upwards towards the formation of a global political economy, and also downwards via the establishment of private spheres of authority over law, welfare, education, etc. Although, generally

speaking, one could argue that there is a decay of the role of conventional nation-states and a decrease of state capacity, globalization, Sassen reminds us, must still be shaped, channelled and enabled by institutions and networks which are rooted in the nation-state. Her insistence is that main attention should be paid to the redefinition of the meaning of “national,” a domain usually referring to as an interface between citizens (national subjects) and the state. This domain, according to Sassen, has been shrinking significantly affecting the levels of welfare provided to the citizens. “Rapid privatization enters the domain of prisons, schools and health care systems, while professional armies replace national forces.” Moreover, there is a development of an increasingly thick international political sphere filled by institutions such as the UN, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which have induced the emergence of what has become known as global civil society consisting of activists who lobby against the inequities of both global capital and power politics.

As a result of these flows, denationalization is not a process on its own but rather a matrix through which globalization is imbricated within the nation-state. Hence, Sassen's narrative is not a simplistic account in which globalization becomes a master process that only reduces state capabilities. Rather, Sassen reveals the complexities of how the global is constituted within or inside the national, and how local experiences of these forces both affect and play into broader global relations. Her analysis thus moves the debate about globalization beyond binarisms to a more complex account of partiality, specificity, and time and place variation. Moreover, she insists that the decay of nation-states in the era of globalization is a much more complicated story than a simple shrinking of the state power. The “encroachment” of the private into the public is only part of the story since the current articulations are marked primarily by instability and flux in which global forces intersect with local relations *inside* the national. This intersection leads to a process of “renationalization” especially in the domain of

migration and security policies (she gives the United States as an example of this by using the examples such as surveillance mechanisms ranging from CCTV cameras to the Patriot Act which undermine one of the foundational principles of liberal democracy – the protection of individual privacy from public scrutiny).

Sassen observes that renationalization also refers to the situation in the Middle East to see the continuing relevance of notions of sovereign territorial integrity, or indeed the part played by nation-states in issues of international conflict, geopolitical manoeuvring and war. By using the notions of territory, authority and rights to assess how regimes of power, political economy and citizenship have changed across time and place, Sassen reveals the concrete ways in which the emergence of the global has disrupted “earlier ways of imagining and conducting political, economic and social relations.”

The anthropologists’ take on the state and neoliberalism

The topic of the state and its transformations vis-a-vis the process of globalization has been also vigorously debated by several anthropologists who have made significant contribution in re-theorizing the state and its power. By focusing on large processes such as collectivization, James Scott, for instance, argues that “high modernist” states govern by using techniques of representation rather than direct rule of power and thus make both natural and social worlds legible. In this process, the state itself becomes a reified actor (Scott 1999: 132). While his account has offered an important glimpse into the dynamics of a centrally-planned social-engineering projects, by what James Scott calls "high modernism," and which inevitably fail regardless whether they take place in Brasil, Tanzania, 19c. Germany or the Soviet Union, a number of anthropologists have pointed out that the modernist state does not exist anymore in its condensed form as discussed by Scott (Ferguson 2006, Ferguson and Gupta 2003, Herzfeld 2005, Sharma and Gupta 2006).

These authors rather take the Foucauldian view of the state as an assemblage of actors and practices, in which non-state actors such as scientists, doctors, I will add artists too, and NGOs, are as complicit with the process of creating regulatory regimes as states are. Arguing along Sassen's lines, these authors contend that they act both directly and indirectly as state agents (for more see (Foucault 1979). This makes even those, seemingly, state-free social spaces to be implicated in state practices. Hence, the arguments of the neoliberal proponents that in the age of late capitalism the role of nation-states is diminishing in the face of the rule of civil society, the market and the large corporations (see for instance, (Ohmae 2005) deserve to be questioned. On the contrary, we should ask whether the social space becomes even more "étatized" and condensed with subtle state regulations (Dunn 2008, Ong and Collier 2005, Verdery 1996).

These anthropological accounts concur with Sassen's approach and make a similar intervention: instead of taking either-or position, the authors argue for the mutual constitutiveness of the role of the state and the process of globalization. While Sassen acknowledges that not all states are the same, one of the primary shortcomings of her account is the predominantly Western/European focus. How globalization affects the "peripheries", the "second, third or fourth worlds," remains outside of Sassen's focus. And it is here that ethnographies make an unsurpassed contribution to the literature discussing the global and national dynamics: by providing contingent portrayals of specific places, ethnographies show how the local is imbricated in larger global processes.

An excellent example of this is Ferguson's contribution on Africa and its role in the globalized world. His analysis explores the continent in the twenty-first century by examining its multifaceted appearances as a place, a predicament, an imaginative object, a "discursive trope," a "place-in-the-world" whose economies and social orders, governance and geography, are undergoing bewilderingly complex transformations (Ferguson 2006). Indeed, Ferguson shows that most often "Africa" refers to crisis, a place of failure, seemingly

insurmountable problems, and as a moral challenge to the international community. His analysis moves beyond the traditional anthropological focus on local communities to explore more general questions about Africa and its place in the contemporary world by questioning the process of globalization, modernity, and their links to worldwide inequality, and social justice. While arguing that in a variety of social and geographical locations Africans increasingly seek to make claims of membership within a global community, he underlines the fact that these claims are an attempt to contest the marginalization that has been a symptom of “globalization” for the African continent. Ferguson contends that such claims demand new understandings of the global, centered less on transnational flows and images of global connection but rather on the social relations that selectively constitute global society, and on the rights and obligations that characterize the contemporary utterly imbalanced world order.

Macedonia and Greece: the background and contemporary outlook

The unavoidable dismemberment of Yugoslavia in 1990-1991, along with the subsequent wars in Slovenia, Croatia and other Yugoslav republics, threatened the stability of the Balkan region. When the attempt to create a loose union between the Former Yugoslav Republics failed, Macedonia, following Slovenia and Croatia, announced its independence, reflecting the results of a referendum held on 8 September, 1991, in which 92% of Macedonia’s citizens voted for this political option (for more see (Dyker D. A.. and Vejvoda 1996, Lampe 1996, Ramet 2005, Woodward 1995).

Although people in Greece had been closely following events on their northern border, many were outraged when they realized that the socialist republic, once part of the Yugoslav Federation, would, on becoming an independent country, carry the name of Macedonia. The demonstration that took place on 20 February, 1992, with an unprecedented one million participants, was only the beginning of a long political dispute involving politicians and

ordinary people that has yet to be resolved. The official Greek position is that there is only one “Macedonia”-- Greek Macedonia. No region in the Balkans except the Greek province of Macedonia can be associated or identified with the ancient kingdom of Macedonia and no people, except Greeks, are entitled to call themselves Macedonians, either as a cultural-ethnic or a geographic-regional denomination. Politicians and scholars in Greece have argued that the Hellenic connection of Ancient Macedonia should not be called into question. They also argued that, by usurping the name of Macedonia, the newly independent state to their north was automatically making irredentist claims for the annexation of Greek Macedonia.

While this conflict triggered many “scientific” studies claiming to prove or disprove claims by the “other” side, almost no research has been conducted on the border itself. Few studies have examined the degree and intensity of border-crossing or explored whether and how human and capital transfers are challenging the border between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece. A notable exception is the literature on Slavic speaking political refugees from Greece. These were people who joined the communists during the Greek civil war (1945-48) and who, as refugees were forced to migrate to other countries (primarily to socialist bloc countries such as Hungary, Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria, but also to the US, Canada and Australia).¹ *Decata Begalci* (the child refugees) who left Greece while their parents fought in the war, were also dispersed throughout the former socialist bloc, or sent overseas to Canada and Australia.

Due to the political schism between Stalin and Tito in 1948, Yugoslavia did not accept large number of political refugees after the defeat of leftist forces at the end of the Greek civil war in 1949, forcing the refugees and their children to seek asylum in many places far from home. Nevertheless, through their efforts to maintain contact with one another, to hold family reunions, and be politically active, these refugees have come to play an important role in the contemporary political landscape, serving to link the Republic of Macedonia with the larger

¹ For more on this topic see Rossos 1991, Mojsov 1954, Pangovska 2000, Kitanoski & Donevski 2003.

region that includes Greek Macedonia. They have used their diasporic networks to form important nationalist alliances, fostering what Anderson (1991) calls “long-distance nationalism” and which Danforth (1995) has explored in depth in his research on refugees in Australia and Canada (Anderson 1991, Danforth 1995). Despite the fact that these Slavic speakers from Greece are now dispersed throughout the world, their existence and political activism has been a major problem for the Greek government, particularly in the domain of property restitution. This question of property has now been officially brought before the European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg.

Events in the 1990s have revealed the Balkans to be a region with a complex shared history in which a division along national lines has never been (or could be) fully resolved by using a one-people-one-state approach (for more on the complex configuration of the Balkans and of Macedonia see (Berman 1993, Cowan 2008, Dimova 2006a, Mazower 2000, Sharp 1997). From the time the Balkan nation-states were created in the 19th and 20th centuries, shaped by the spread of national ideologies, it has proved impossible to create homogenous national populations by erasing the presence of “others” whose language, religion or way of life differ from those of the dominant national group. As one of the most heterogeneous and contested regions of the world since Ottoman times, “Macedonia” has served as a mirror onto which Greek, Bulgarian (and Serbian) nationalisms were projected (Aarbaake 2003, Dimova 1999).

In his analysis of the making of modern Greece, Herzfeld (1982) describes the efforts (and problems) of the newly established Greek state in 1833 to live up to the ideas that European intellectuals held of Hellenism and ancient Hellas (Herzfeld 1982). The reality that politicians encountered on the ground was quite different from imagined past glories. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the majority of the population was rural and the dominant spoken language was so-called Romeic, which was quite different from the “pure Greek language” (*katharevousa*) preferred and enforced mainly by intellectual elites (Herzfeld 1982,

p. 6). In the second half of the 19 c., universalistic views of the grandeur of ancient Hellas gradually shifted from a collective historical reference to Western modernity into a Greek national geopolitical claim (Christopoulos/Tsitselikis 2003). This shift required Greek intellectuals to fit the vast rural population into the project of forging historical continuity between modern Greece and ancient Hellas, a project they tried to accomplish by invoking the social scientific disciplines of folklore, anthropology and archeology to establish Greece as the “cradle of European civilization” (Herzfeld 1982, Herzfeld 2008). It is this struggle to claim historical continuity that determines the power of symbols such as the name Macedonia, Alexandar the Great, the Star of Vergina, and Phillip the Great. The right to use symbols that refer to the classical past, and which are invoked to bridge the gap between modern and ancient times, comprise one of the central issues in today’s dispute between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia (Voß, Haslinger, and Niehoff-Panagiotidis 2000/2001).

Greek nationalists faced not only the problem of trying to document continuities between ancient and modern Greece, but also that of trying to construct a culturally homogenous population, appropriate to the image of a modern nation-state, in a region that had never before existed as a sovereign entity. As Kostopoulos (2003) has argued, the “problem” of minorities became apparent as early as the first census, which was conducted on the eve of independence in 1828 (Kostopoulos 2003). During Ottoman times, afterwards and continuing to present day, it has been evident that border areas of the Greek state house minority populations that reveal the state’s heterogeneous character. Despite their almost full assimilation as Greek national subjects, the Jews, Arbanites, Vlach and Roma people, along with the Slav population in Greek Macedonia (Aarbaake 2003, Karakasidou 1997, Kostopoulos 2003), perceive themselves, and are perceived by others, as different. Similarly, the people of Northern Epirus (Green 2005) and Moslems from Northern Thrace (Trubeta 2003, Voss 2003) appear to be marginal people living in the margins. The existence of these “minorities” has made it difficult for the Greek nation-state to project an image of cultural

homogeneity. It has constantly had to face the problem of “naming the Other” and of tolerating difference (Kostopoulos 2003).

The story of Macedonian nationalism reveals a different trajectory from that of Greece. It was not formed as a stable political subject until 1944. At that time, the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, as part of the Yugoslav Federation, was formally encouraged to develop a national identity that would distinguish it from the neighboring republics. The Macedonian language acquired an official orthography in 1945 and became one of the most important national symbols. The state supported a major effort by linguists to distinguish the language from Bulgarian by using the central Vardar dialect as a basis for literary Macedonian (for more on Macedonian language and nation-building see (Friedman 1975, Friedman 1997). Further efforts to construct and produce a distinct national identity were carried out by writers, historians and folklorists. As part of the “Yugoslav experiment” (Rusinow 1977), which after 1948 and the split between Stalin and Tito was predicated on combining socialist ideals with national distinctiveness, Tito and the Yugoslav government promoted the rise of a Macedonian national identity. At the same time, however, they discouraged nationalist claims to the larger region of Macedonia (Banac 1984, Banac 1989, Dimova 2006a, Grandits 2008, Rusinow 1977, Shoup 1968).

The dissolution of the socialist Yugoslav Federation and the independence of the Republic of Macedonia in 1991 marked a new chapter in the development of Macedonian nationalism. Since then, the most challenging domestic issue faced by the Macedonian government has concerned the Albanian minority and their political demands for integration into Macedonian society. Because most Albanians in Macedonia are Muslims, they are widely perceived to be closely connected to fellow Muslims in Albania and Kosovo, and thus irrevocably different from ethnic Macedonians, who are predominantly Orthodox Christians and who speak a southern Slavic language shared with Bulgaria and Serbia. These differences

in religion and language appear to condemn ethnic Albanians who live in the Republic of Macedonia to forever being the “other” within.

The nineties were also marked by a surge of nationalism in the Republic of Macedonia, which involved stressing Macedonia’s connections with such historical figures as Phillip of Macedonia and Alexander the Great. This surge culminated in 1992, when the Macedonian parliament adopted the five-ray Star of Vergina as the official flag of the independent republic. (It was forced to abandon the symbol in 1995, however, due to strong international pressure.) Regardless of which political party has held power in Macedonia, either the left-oriented Social Democrats (SDSM) or the right-wing nationalist party (VMRO-DPMNE), the republic has continued its intensive revival of “antiquity.” Monuments of Alexander the Great and of Phillip of Macedonia were erected, and archaeological “proofs” of Macedonia’s ancient heritage were excavated. One of the central squares in Skopje was renamed Pela. The airport in Skopje was named after Alexander the Great. The official history in school text books was rewritten to include the ancient period and even to question the solely Slavic origin of modern day Macedonians (Brown 2003).

Since its independence in 1991, the Republic of Macedonia has been struggling to create a unique national identity, similar to the unique identities enjoyed by Western European states that undertook the task of nation-building during the 19th century. Macedonia has been facing a difficult task, however, due to the Republic’s disputes with neighbouring states: with Greece over the name of Macedonia, with Bulgaria over the status of Macedonian as a separate language, and with Serbia over the independence of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. Such disputes have only contributed to the fervor of ethno-nationalist sentiments within Macedonia. Finally, the political/social movement and demands by the Albanian minority living in Macedonia, especially after the 2001 military insurgency, added a one more dimension to the already complex ethno-national dynamics of the country.

The dispute between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia that began in the early 90s still seems far from resolution. If anything, the tension appears to be growing stronger, particularly since March of 2008, when Greece vetoed the Republic of Macedonia's attempt to join NATO while, at the same, extending an invitation to Croatia and Albania. Greece is also threatening to block Macedonia's attempts to become a member of the European Union. The Republic of Macedonia, in the meantime, has intensified its attempts to revive its "ancient" heritage through sponsoring popular, artistic, academic and political representations of its imagined past.

Despite the growing bitterness of the political dispute between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia, economic exchanges between the two countries have been flourishing. Greece is the largest investor in the Republic of Macedonia's most important economic sectors, such as energy, finances, communication, food and textiles. Moreover, the border areas are experiencing an unprecedented movement of goods, people, symbols and ideas on a daily basis.

While taking into account the complex history underlying the conflict between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia, I would pose the question for future research to which extent movements of goods and people across the border transcend nationalism. Moreover, I would critically examine the relationship between Greece and EU. Because Greece belongs to the EU, and its border with Macedonia is therefore a border with the European Union, during upcoming fieldwork I will investigate how this border has hardened and softened over time. It is important to note that although Greece is a member of the Schengen agreement, Macedonian citizens, regardless whether or not they already have a visa for another European Schengen country, have to apply for a special Greek visa in order to cross the border. Obtaining Greek visa, however, is much easier than obtaining Schengen visa. As a result, it is much easier for a Macedonian to enter Greece than to travel in the rest of the European Schengen zone. How do these border-crossing arrangements shape the presence of Europe

among Macedonian citizens? To what extent do Europe and Greece conceptually overlap? Do they represent two separate entities in the national imaginary of Macedonian citizens? How relevant is Herzfeld's (1982) argument that ideologically Greece and Europe are twin concepts--symbols of a cultural superiority that has survived innumerable changes in moral and political orders -- for understanding the contemporary movement of people and goods across the border between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia ?

In order to explore how the unequal relationship between Greece, as a member of the EU, and Macedonia, as an aspiring member, affects cross-border relations, we will have to pay close attention to changes in state and supranational borders brought about after 1989 by the transformation of socialist entities into full-fledged nation-states. And although Greece is a member of the EU, and thus a representative of the European ideal, it is the only country in Europe that has the word "modern" placed before its name, "implying that (to the modern mind), the classical version was much more at the heart of things, or even at the root of things" (Green 2005, p. 2).

Instead of viewing the dispute between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece as an insurmountable problem, as a political or moral challenge to the international community, an analysis on border-movement between Macedonia and Greece needs to take a fresh look at this topic by providing a detailed ethnographic account of the specific places and social realities within and beyond the border areas of the two countries. The primary aim should be to develop a new approach to understanding how borders are actually and symbolically constructed, challenged and subverted. While assessing how borders affect different actors by becoming "significant, meaningful or meaningless," such analysis should explore how borders, grounded in the neoliberal context, come to acquire, erase or transform people's senses of national belonging, historical legitimacy, and social distinction. One needs to keep in mind the multiple and "intertwined" levels of border-crossing in order to develop a deeper understanding how the logic of neoliberal sovereignty affects nation-state loyalties and

people's senses of belonging and national sentiment on the border area between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece.

The main objective of my research as part of the COST action thus will be to explore relationships between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia that have been obscured by the highly publicized dispute between the two countries over Macedonia's name. Although the naming dispute appears to have erected an insurmountable barrier between the two countries, it can be argued that the border between them has been melting. New opportunities for economic, human, and symbolic exchanges have been opening up in ever increasing numbers.

As mentioned earlier, the main analytical framework will be the recent literature on neoliberalism, which traces how neoliberal political-economic regimes are reconfiguring relationships between the nation state and its subjects, the governors and the governed, through shifts in the nature of sovereignty, territoriality, power and knowledge (Appadurai 2006, Ferguson 2006). In the research I will pay special attention to how contemporary states are being reconfigured by the increasing privatization of former state functions and by the growing number of private authorities involved in transnational economic investments (Ong and Collier 2005, Sassen 2006, Sharma and Gupta 2006, Tsing 2005). I will adopt an approach that focuses on the contemporary globalized and neoliberal transnational circuits that are redefining the functions of nation-states, not only in South-eastern Europe, but in the larger context where political disputes coexist hand-in-hand with intensive economic, symbolic and human exchanges across borders. By drawing on the literature on neoliberalism I hope to reveal a complex articulation of recent political-economic changes that calls into question reductionist views of uni-directional economic exploitation, political hegemony or state-nationalism. This research should show how borders, infused with political, economic and symbolic features, can simultaneously become the terrain for both exclusionary and emancipatory practices for the actors who are involved in border-crossing on an everyday level.

Much of this work focuses on the significance of social, moral and/or material aspects of borders: the way that borders (or their crossing) mark differences that affect people's lives and their senses of location, belonging or dislocation. This project's main empirical contribution will be to reveal how the border between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia is being reconfigured, suspended, or reasserted. I expect to find that different actors will have different visions of the border. For example, many impoverished Macedonians might prefer a more porous border which would allow them to move freely without a visa, whereas Greek entrepreneurs might prefer to keep the Republic of Macedonia isolated so that Macedonian enterprises can be cheaply bought and Macedonian labor hired at low rates.

While fully aware of the complexity and fluidity involved in border practices, and of the difficulty of distinguishing between flows of capital, people (labor) and ideas/symbols, we will, for analytical purposes, investigate "melting borders" and border-crossing by focusing on three main domains: capital, labor, and symbols. The goal is to identify the common ground in which these domains/flows intersect. How are the contemporary globalized and neoliberal transnational circuits redefining the functions of nation-states? How do the processes of governance and nationalism emerge and become internalized in the border areas between these two countries, where the ongoing political dispute over Macedonia's name coexists with intensive economic, symbolic and human exchanges?

Border-crossing of capital

According to the Programme for Stimulating Investment in the Republic of Macedonia (2003) (*Programa za Pottiknvanje Investicii vo Repblika Makedonija, 2003*) Greece was the largest investor in the country between 1991 and 2002, followed by Lichtenstein, Switzerland, Germany, Hungary, Austria and Slovenia (Programa 2003). More precisely, since 1994, which marked the end of the economic embargo imposed by Greece in 1992 and 1993, Greek enterprises have invested more money in Macedonia than enterprises of any other country

(Stopanska Komora na Republika Makedonija 2005). Greek-owned corporations have purchased national companies in the most strategic sectors of the Macedonian economy. Hellenic Petroleum bought the Macedonian Oil Refinery OKTA. Stopanska Banka, Macedonia's largest state bank was purchased by Greek owners. More recently, the Greek Alpha Bank entered Macedonia's financial market, competing with Stopanska for dominance over Macedonian-owned banks. The second largest mobile phone operator, Cosmofon, is a Greek-owned firm that recently introduced a fixed telephone operator. Finally, Greek investment in the large chain of textile factories that stretch across the southern part of the Republic of Macedonia between Bitola and Prilep has been crucial for in reviving Macedonia's textile industry which suffered after the collapse of state-owned factories. At the same time that Greek companies have been acquiring, and invigorating, Macedonian enterprises, many Macedonian companies have been achieving economic success by relying on Greek partners for export/import ventures (Makedonija vo Brojki, 2008). The fact that such partnerships form a significant presence at economic fairs in both countries reveals that governments on both sides of the border have been encouraging mutual investments.

Border-crossing of Labor

Greek money has also been used to hire Macedonian labor. An article in the Greek newspaper Elefteros Tipos (Ελεύθερος Τύπος) (March 8, 2008) reveals that Greeks invested 263 million US dollars in the Republic of Macedonia during the period between 2000 – 2006, and that Greek-owned companies employed around 20.000 Macedonian citizens. Moreover, due to economic difficulties in the Republic of Macedonia, many of its citizens have migrated abroad seeking jobs. Greece is a popular destination, particularly for seasonal labor. During the peak tourist season, cheap labor from Macedonia migrates to Greek coastal areas, primarily in the North. Most of the janitors, waiters, bar tenders and kitchen workers in the largest hotels in Halkidiki, for example, are from the Republic of Macedonia. Greece also

attracts seasonal labor from Macedonia to work in agriculture during the harvest season, particularly on the orange plantations in Greek Macedonia.

Border-crossing of ideas, symbols, and practices

Private colleges and universities in Thessaloniki have become a prestigious destination for students from the Republic of Macedonia who can afford to pay for an education. The business schools affiliated with the American College and City College in Thessaloniki and North College are particularly popular. Despite the fact they charge far higher tuition than Macedonian state and private universities, these schools are popular with students from the republic of Macedonia because they offer a more affordable (and attainable) business degree than universities in other Western European countries (Makedonija vo Brojki, 2008). At the same time, language schools teaching Greek or Macedonian have been sprouting up in both countries as more and more job advertisements, on both sides of the border, are demanding that applicants have fluency in Macedonian and Greek

The rise of small and mid-size businesses in Bitola and Gevgelija reveal that these towns have become popular destinations for Greeks living in the border area who hope to obtain cheap dental, medical, and beauty/cosmetic services, or who want to organize large family celebrations in cheap restaurants in Bitola or to buy cheap groceries. At the same time, members of the *nouveaux riche* from Macedonia are travelling to Greece to shop in high end stores, enjoy gourmet meals, and patronize exclusive vacation spots. Some are even purchasing real estate, thus gaining access to valuable symbolic capital.

The crucial aspect in analyzing these domains will be to see how they are informed by notions of class and social hierarchy. My subsequent research will try to answer such questions as how people with different social backgrounds conceptualize and relate to the nationalistic claims on both sides of the border? How does state nationalism become internalized and incorporated by people of different social classes? What is the relationship

between nationalism and social class, given the porousness of the border as revealed by movements of capital, seasonal workers, *nouveaux riche* and bargain seekers. How prominent is the distinction between different “types” of nationalism as experienced by employers and employees? Can we distinguish between competing nationalisms, such as state nationalism and the national claims of investors, employers, employees, consumers or tourists?

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